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Abstract 
Words mean different things in different contexts, a phenomenon called polysemy. We talk 
about lines of both people and poetry, and long distances or times. Polysemy lets a limited 
vocabulary capture the great variety in our experiences, while highlighting commonalities. But 
how? Are polysemous senses contextually-driven modifications of core meanings, or must 
each sense be separately memorized? We provide evidence for both accounts: Core 
meanings are used when senses follow a regular pattern (e.g., animal names for foodstuffs; 
noisy/tasty chicken), while separate representations are used when senses are 
idiosyncratically related (e.g., sheet of/drinking glass). Polysemy-type predicts participantsʼ 
ability to avoid referential ambiguity when naming aloud pictures that are sometimes 
accompanied by same-name foils (e.g., both types of chicken/glass). Participants fail to avoid 
ambiguity for idiosyncratically-related foils, indicating separate meanings, but succeed for 
regularly-related foils, indicating a common core. We discuss implications for the relationship 
between word meanings and concepts. 
 
149 words 
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The Truth about Chickens and Bats: Ambiguity Avoidance 
Distinguishes Types of Polysemy. 
 
Although the concepts we use to think about the world appear to be unambiguous, the words 
we use to express them are clearly not. This is most obvious for homophones like bat or 
bank, but in fact almost every common word is subtly ambiguous, a phenomenon called 
polysemy. For instance, we can talk about lines on a page, lines of people, lines of text, 
fishing lines, telephone lines, and so on. Each sense of line means something slightly 
different, but they are all clearly connected by a common thread.  
 These linked senses provide language with vivid expressive power in a very economical 
fashion: A single word can have many interpretations, and even when its interpretation is 
fixed by context, the other senses can be alluded to. An account of polysemy is therefore 
necessary for explaining linguistic compositionality and creativity, the limitless possible 
meanings that can be generated by combining words. 
 In addition, as a conduit between words and concepts, polysemy can help explain how 
language and thought are linked. Those common threads that permit expressivity are 
presumably a reflection of, and may themselves influence, links between nonlinguistic 
concepts. By parceling multiple senses under a common term, language highlights similarities 
and relationships that might otherwise go unnoticed as we learn about the world. Moreover, 
by frequently highlighting metaphorical or analogical relationships (e.g., long describes both 
spatial extension and temporal duration; hard describes both physical attribute and 
personality trait) polysemy may provide one avenue by which metaphors influence cognition 
(Barsalou, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010; Uleman, 
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2005). In light of all this, it is important to understand exactly how words are linked to their 
underlying concepts. 
  For homophonous words, theorists agree that each word has multiple separate 
meanings (Ferreira, Slevc, & Rogers, 2005; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). But the 
representation of polysemy is more controversial. One possibility, suggested by both 
psychologists and linguists, is that different senses do not need to be stored and represented 
at all. Instead, apparent senses are actually elaborations on an underspecified core meaning, 
which only lists characteristic and critical features (e.g., Caramazza & Grober, 1976; Frisson, 
2009; Nunberg, 1979; Strigin, 1998). For instance, lineʼs meaning might specify a 1-
dimensional spatial extension but omit mention of paper, people or text, which have to be 
filled in using context and world knowledge.  
 Consistent with these “core-meaning” approaches, polysemous and homophonous 
words behave differently in various experimental paradigms. Lexical decision times to words 
go down as the type count of polysemous senses increases, but go up as the type count of 
homophonous meanings increases (Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002). Reading times 
for sentences that use less-frequent senses of polysemous words (e.g., Koreaʼs war sense) 
are not reliably greater than for more-frequent senses (Frazier & Rayner, 1990; Frisson & 
Pickering, 1999), unlike the characteristic finding for homophones (Frazier & Rayner, 1990; 
Rayner & Frazier, 1989), suggesting that senses and meanings are processed differently. 
  Core meanings satisfy our intuition that senses are related. But, for any given polyseme, 
it has proven hard to precisely specify a core meaning that captures all the associated senses 
but not the unassociated senses. This difficulty has led other researchers to propose that 
senses have to be individually learned rather than inferred online; that is to say, polysemes 
and homophones have the same format (Klein & Murphy, 2001; Lehrer, 1990). In support of 
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this, Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002) found that polysemes behave like homophones in 
several lexical processing tasks. For instance, reading a polysemous or homophonous word 
used with one sense/meaning (liberal paper) raises reading times for the same word using a 
different sense/meaning (wrapping paper). 
 Stored-meaning theories have one major difficulty: In their simplest form, they cannot 
account for the productivity of polysemy. Many senses follow predictable, generalizable 
patterns, a phenomenon called regular polysemy (Apresjan, 1974). For example, food 
produced from an animal or plant typically takes the same name (tasty chicken), a pattern 
that can be extended for novel foods (tasty penguin). Regular polysemy stands in contrast to 
instances of irregular polysemy, such as line or paper, which do not follow a predictable and 
generalizable pattern. Stored-meaning theories cannot explain productivity without introducing 
additional machinery to generate senses. Some theories assume that senses are generated 
by operations akin to morphological rules (e.g., an animal→food rule transforms chicken from 
its base animal meaning to a foodstuff meaning, Copestake & Briscoe, 1995; Lehrer, 1990; 
Murphy, 2007; Rabagliati, Marcus, & Pylkkänen, 2011) while others assume that both senses 
are specified in a single, complex (generative) lexical entry (Pustejovsky, 1995). By contrast, 
core meanings can explain both regular and irregular polysemy through the same mechanism 
of inference-to-the-best-explanation. 
 The critical question, then, is: Does polysemy reflect a mixture of stored irregular senses 
and generated regular senses, or are all polysemous senses generated through core 
meanings? Although previous experimental work has tended to elide the distinction between 
regular and irregular polysemy, this difference may explain the literatureʼs divergent findings. 
Many experiments providing evidence for core meanings used regular polysemes as stimuli 
(Frazier & Rayner, 1990; Frisson & Pickering, 1999), while the experiments equating 
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homophones with polysemes used mainly irregular polysemes (Klein & Murphy, 2001, 2002). 
Further evidence for distinct types of polysemy comes from Klepousniotou, Titone and 
Romero (2008). They repeated Klein and Murphyʼs (2001) priming experiment with 
polysemes that have either a weak, medium, or strong semantic relation between senses. 
Interestingly, while the weak and medium groups replicated Klein and Murphyʼs inhibitory 
priming, the highly-related senses showed no priming. This difference is compatible with two 
interpretations. One possibility is that highly-related polysemes use a distinct type of 
representation, and while Klepousniotou and colleagues did not manipulate regularity directly, 
examination of their stimuli indicates that a majority of their highly-related words followed a 
productive polysemy pattern (and these words were rare in the weak and medium conditions). 
 But alternatively, the difference could have arisen from other features of the stimuli. 
Prime phrases that should have unambiguously selected a sense were considerably more 
ambiguous in the highly-related condition. For instance, sandwich lunch vs. afternoon lunch 
was intended to distinguish the physical (plate of food) and temporal (time of day) senses, but 
neither is clearly ruled out. Furthermore, the adjectives disambiguating highly-related phrases 
were, by necessity, semantically related to both senses, potentially overriding any inhibitory 
priming. Thus, since the interpretation of these findings is ambiguous, there is no clear 
evidence for a distinction between types of polysemy. 
 To directly test whether irregular and regular polysemes dissociate, we moved away 
from comprehension measures to a new paradigm: Ambiguity avoidance in language 
production. Ferreira et al. (2005) show that, when asked to unambiguously identify a pictured 
object that has a homophonous label (e.g., a baseball bat), participants mistakenly produce 
temporarily ambiguous names if a homophonous foil is also depicted (e.g., saying “bat...no, 
baseball bat” if an animal bat foil is included). However, they immediately recognize and avoid 
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the ambiguity if the foil is a second instance from the same category (e.g., saying  “larger 
baseball bat”). That is to say, participants avoid ambiguities at the level of word-meaning, but 
not phonology. Ferreira (2007; Ferreira et al., 2005) therefore argues that speakers can 
detect overlap in meaning while formulating a message. But because homophones lack 
semantic overlap, speakers must rely on error-prone, comprehension-based detection, 
monitoring their speech for potential ambiguity. 
 If all polysemes have a single core meaning, then these results predict that participants 
should be able to avoid ambiguity when naming polysemes. But, if polysemy is a mixture of 
stored irregulars and generated regulars, then ambiguity avoidance should be more frequent 
for regular polysemes than irregular polysemes, because the former share a common 
meaning.  
 We therefore compared naming patterns when ambiguity was caused by depictions of 
homophones, irregular polysemes, regular polysemes, or two instances from the same 
category. Four pictures were displayed on a screen and assigned an order from 1 to 4. 
Participants memorized the order then named the pictures. To quantify ambiguity avoidance, 
we compared the proportion of ambiguous names produced in the presence or absence of a 
same-name foil. 
 
Method 
 Participants 
52 individuals with English as a first language (undergraduates or Cambridge, MA community 
members) participated for cash/course-credit. 
 
 Materials 
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Target-foil pairs were photographs depicting 6 homophones, 12 irregular polysemes, 12 
regular polysemes, and 6 same category ambiguities. These were normed so that the 
probability of providing the intended ambiguous name (e.g., bat), without prenominal 
modification, did not significantly differ within pairs or across ambiguity types (see 
supplementary materials-R). 
 Homophonous meanings had separate entries in the Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
Irregular polysemy senses were listed under the same entry. Six irregulars did not fall under 
any systematic pattern of polysemy that we are aware of (shirt/emergency button, single-
edge/electric razor), and six fell under a pattern in which a material describes a product 
(sheets of/drinking glass, sea/kitchen sponge). This pattern is common cross-linguistically but 
(unlike regular polysemes) the extended meaning is unpredictable (e.g., it is unclear what a 
titanium would be). Regular polysemes followed two patterns, object-food (noisy/tasty 
chicken, stalks/kernels of corn) and object-representation (real/toy monkey, real/toy zebra). 
Same category items were visually dissimilar category members (e.g., luxury/rowing boat, 
small/large dog). 
 Participants received 36 experimental trials (18 ambiguous, with target, foil, and two 
filler pictures; 18 unambiguous, replacing foil with filler), and 40 fillers in random order. Trial- 
and ambiguity-type were varied within subjects, using a Latin square design. Target and foil 
were counterbalanced between participants (i.e., half received baseball bat as target and 
animal bat as foil, and half the reverse). To encourage both simple and complex labels, half 
the filler trials had a third picture best described by a single word (pen), and half a complex 
phrase (washing machine). 
  
 Procedure 
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Pictures were displayed in a cross pattern, with position randomized. After a 2.5s preview, 
each picture was labeled from 1 to 4, with a 500ms pause between labels. The target picture 
was always in third position and the foil in fourth. Following a 1s pause the numbers 
disappeared and participants named each picture in order. 
 Participants were told that the study assessed communication, some trials would be 
ambiguous, and they should name the pictures aloud so that another person could 
reconstruct the ordering. Ten practice trials began the experiment. 
 
 Analyses 
Experimental trials were transcribed and coded by a research assistant, and reliability-coded 
by the first author. Agreement was 97%; disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Following Ferreira et al. (2005), we coded whether descriptions were temporarily ambiguous, 
based on whether the description of the target (third) picture lacked prenominal modification 
(e.g., glass, glass for a window, glass pane). Unambiguous descriptions used premodification 
(e.g., pane of glass, window glass) or a different word (e.g., screens). We describe 
temporarily ambiguous names as “bare names”. 
 We analyzed how bare name production varied over trial type (control/ambiguous), 
ambiguity type (homophones/irregular polysemes/regular polysemes/same category), and 
their interaction using a mixed-effects logistic regression (with maximally-appropriate random-
effects structure). We dummy-coded our predictors so that the control homophone condition 
served as a baseline against which we compared effects for other lexical ambiguity types. 
 
Results 
 The proportion of bare names in the control trials of the homophone baseline did not 
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differ from those in the control trials of any of the other conditions (all zʼs < 1.4, ns, see Figure 
1 and Table 1). For homophones, bare name proportions did not reliably differ between 
ambiguous and control trials; that is, participants had difficulty avoiding ambiguity 
(Mcontrol=0.56(SD=0.28), Mambiguous=0.44(0.33), B=-0.71(Standard Error=0.44), Waldʼs z=1.61, 
ns.). Our regression tested whether the effect of trial-type for other ambiguities differed from 
this baseline. Replicating Ferreira and colleagues, participants were better able to avoid 
ambiguity for the same category items: The decrease in bare name production was reliably 
larger than for homophones (Mcontrol=.0.55(0.32), Mambiguous=0.15(0.23), B=-2.08(0.66), z=3.17, 
p<.01). 
 Critically, the patterns for irregular and regular polysemy diverged. The effect of trial 
type on irregular polysemes was not reliably different from the effect on homophones 
(Mcontrol=0.60(0.22), Mambiguous=0.44(0.22), B=-0.16(0.51), z=-0.32, ns). But regular polysemes 
patterned like unambiguous words, showing a reliably larger difference between control and 
ambiguous trials (Mcontrol=0.66(0.23), Mambiguous=0.28(0.21), B=-1.76(0.56), z=-3.16, p<.01). 
Importantly, a direct comparison showed greater ambiguity avoidance for regular polysemes 
than irregulars (B=-1.64(0.47), z=3.5, p <.001; see supplement). These results support a 
distinction between the representations used in regular and irregular polysemy, and are 
inconsistent with theories in which all senses are inferred from core meanings. (An additional 
analysis shows unchanged results when counting fluent phrases [glass pane] as 
unambiguous. Additional experiments have replicated these results with longer and shorter 
preview times. See supplement.) 
 We then tested alternative explanations for the irregular/regular distinction. Perhaps the 
pattern-like nature of regular polysemy allowed participants to predict potentially ambiguous 
picture-pairs? If so, ambiguity avoidance should increase over the course of the experiment 
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for regular polysemes. A further dummy variable was added to the original regression 
indicating which half of the experiment each trial occurred in, along with its full set of 
interactions. However, ambiguity avoidance for regular polysemes did not vary across the 
experiment (B=-0.37(0.70), z=0.53, ns). 
 Next, we tested a similarity-based explanation. We contrasted two models, one in which 
our effects were solely due to differences in similarity, and one in which they could 
additionally be caused by differences in lexical representation. We collected similarity ratings 
for the picture-pairs (asking how much the objects had in common, on a 1-7 scale) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=24-30 per pair; see supplement). 
 We then evaluated whether a model containing predictors for trial type, similarity 
(centered and standardized), and their interaction explained as much variance as a more 
complex model including additional predictors for ambiguity type and the interaction of 
ambiguity type and trial type (we did not include a three-way interaction, which would have 
modeled differential similarity effects on ambiguity-avoidance for each ambiguity type). In fact, 
even accounting for additional complexity, the larger model explained significantly more 
variance (χ2(6)=22.9, p<.001). Similarity may play some role in this task, but it did not fully 
explain the distinction between irregular and regular polysemes. 
 
Discussion 
Polysemy lets a limited vocabulary capture the great variety in our experiences, while 
highlighting commonalities. Our participantsʼ failure to notice and preempt referential 
ambiguity for irregular polysemes, and their relative success with regular polysemes, suggest 
that this mapping between ambiguous words and unambiguous concepts is achieved in two 
ways: Storage of individual senses (irregulars) and constrained inference over core meanings 
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(regulars). 
 This dichotomy has implications for broader theories of language and language 
development. Accounts of how words are semantically composed into sentences (both in 
comprehension and production) will require mechanisms for combining both core meanings 
and individual senses. Developmental accounts of the lexicon need to explain how children 
learn individual senses while also constructing core meanings. 
 More broadly, our data constrain accounts of how metaphorical relationships in the 
lexicon (weighty idea, cold personality) might influence cognition, by showing that the 
common threads linking senses do not always pass through core meanings. But they leave 
open exactly what sort of conceptual structures contribute to the economical yet vivid 
expressive capacity of polysemy. 
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Table 1 - Unstandardized coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression analysis of 
ambiguous name production. Predictors were dummy coded, with the unambiguous control 
homophone condition as baseline, so reported predictors show differences from that baseline. 
 
Predictor Coefficient Waldʼs Z statistic 
Intercept (Control Homophone condition) 0.38 (0.44) 0.86 
Effect for Irregular Polysemes (coded 1, 
homophones  = 0)  
0.19 (0.53) 0.37 
Effect for Regular Polysemes (coded 1, 
homophones  = 0) 
0.72 (0.53) 1.36 
Effect for Same Category (coded 1, homophones  
= 0) 
-0.11 (0.61) 0.19 
Effect of Ambiguity (on Homophones, 1 = 
ambiguous, 0 = unambiguous control) 
-0.71 (0.44) 1.61 
Additional Effect of Ambiguity on Irregular 
Polysemes (coded 1, homophones  = 0) . 
-0.16 (0.51) 0.32 
Additional Effect of Ambiguity on Regular 
Polysemes (coded 1, homophones = 0). 
-1.76 (0.56) 3.16** 
Additional Effect of Ambiguity on Same Category 
(coded 1, homophones = 0) 
-2.08 (0.66) 3.17** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **p<.01 
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Figure 1 - Proportion of unmodified names by trial type and by ambiguity type. Bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
